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Abstract
Insurance fraud occurs when policyholders file claims that are exaggerated or based on
intentional damages. This contribution develops a fraud detection strategy by extracting
insightful information from the social network of a claim. First, we construct a network by
linking claims with all their involved parties, including the policyholders, brokers, experts,
and garages. Next, we establish fraud as a social phenomenon in the network and use the Bi-
Rank algorithm with a fraud specific query vector to compute a fraud score for each claim.
From the network, we extract features related to the fraud scores as well as the claims’
neighborhood structure. Finally, we combine these network features with the claim-specific
features and build a supervised model with fraud in motor insurance as the target variable.
Although we build a model for only motor insurance, the network includes claims from all
available lines of business. Our results show that models with features derived from the
network perform well when detecting fraud and even outperform the models using only the
classical claim-specific features. Combining network and claim-specific features further im-
proves the performance of supervised learning models to detect fraud. The resulting model
flags highly suspicions claims that need to be further investigated. Our approach provides
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1 Introduction 2
a guided and intelligent selection of claims and contributes to a more effective fraud inves-
tigation process.
Key words: Fraud detection, Social networks, Bipartite networks, BiRank, Supervised
learning, Insurance.
1 Introduction
This paper presents a big-data risk analytics approach to detect suspicious insurance claims
with an analytical model that combines the information from a network of insurance claims
and involved parties with the traditional claim-specific features collected by the insurer. In-
surance companies bring security to society by offering protection against financial losses. By
organizing and managing pools of risks they enable individuals and companies to transfer risk
in exchange for a premium. Fraud, the wrongful or criminal deception intended for financial
or personal gain, is a considerable concern in many industries, such as in telecommunication
and healthcare. Other types and areas of fraud include corruption, money laundering, tax eva-
sion, identity theft and credit card fraud, to name a few (Baesens et al., 2015). The insurance
industry is no exception. Insurance fraud is encountered when policyholders file claims that
are exaggerated, fake or based on intentional damage with the intention to receive compen-
sation from the insurance company. In non-life insurance, the total yearly cost of fraudulent
claims is estimated at over e1 billion in the UK and $30 billion in the United States, which,
in the latter case, corresponds to an increased yearly premium of between $200 and $300 for
an average family (FBI, 2012; Smith et al., 2014). In Australia, fraud has been identified as
the most costly crime category, with insurance fraud amounting a total of AU$2.1 billion every
year, equivalent to AU$73 per insurance policy (Smith et al., 2014). Furthermore, the Dutch
Association of Insurers reports a saving of e79 million in 2015 and 82 million in 2018 because
of fraud identification efforts (Verbond van Verzekeraars, 2016, 2019). Undeniably, it is in the
interest of both insurance companies and their customers to detect fraudulent activity to keep
insurance contracts affordable.
When an insurance claim is flagged because of suspicion of fraud, fraud investigators use their
expertise to confirm whether the claim is fraudulent or not (Warren and Schweitzer, 2018). The
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insights obtained from such investigations are then used to help detect other suspicious claims.
This comprises the fraud detection cycle. The rare occurrence of fraud on the one hand and
the many uninvestigated cases or claims on the other hand, are important challenges in the
construction of fraud detection methods (Jensen, 1997; Baesens et al., 2015). The uncommon
nature of fraud creates imbalanced data sets, where fraudulent claims are at risk of being
treated as insignificant in analytical models, causing a bias towards the non-fraudulent claims.
In addition, organizations have typically neither the time nor the resources to investigate all
(suspicious) claims and to label each claim as fraudulent or legitimate (Warren and Schweitzer,
2018). As a result, only a small fraction of all claims have a known label. A fraud detection
model is an efficient way to lead the investigators in the direction of fraudulent claims. By
using techniques such as business rules or analytical models, only the most suspicious claims
can be given to the investigator for further inspection. This avoids spending precious time on
investigating non-fraudulent claims. Insurance fraud materializes in various ways; garages and
hospitals may for example overcharge for material and work. Here, we consider fraud committed
by policyholders when filing claims, such as false declarations, exaggeration of damage and
intentional damage.
In the insurance industry, fraud detection models are based on business rules as well as analyti-
cal techniques (EIOPA, 2019). Business rules are usually formed by intuition, past experiences
and input from the experts that conduct the investigations. Both unsupervised and supervised
machine learning methods have been successfully used in the literature on insurance fraud de-
tection strategies. A first and prominent fraud detection technique is PRIDIT, which computes
a claim-specific fraud suspicion score via principal component analysis of so-called RIDIT scores
(Brockett et al., 2002; Ai et al., 2009). RIDIT transforms a claim’s available categorical features
into a set of numerical features, reflecting the relative abnormality of the observed categorical
features. As such, the scores represent the likelihood of fraud and can be used as input in
further statistical analysis. Stripling et al. (2018); Ghorbani and Farzai (2018); Nian et al.
(2016); Hainaut (2019) use principles from anomaly detection for unsupervised fraud detection
strategies that aim at finding unusual and uncommon behavior deviating from the norm in the
dataset. Approaching insurance fraud detection as a classification problem, Viaene et al. (2002)
present a benchmark study of classification techniques. This supervised learning perspective
has the advantage of learning fraud patterns in the data but requires past knowledge about
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fraudulent cases, which is rare because of the high class imbalance. Several fraud detection
approaches tackle the problem of class imbalance by rebalancing the dataset using sampling
techniques, such as under- and oversampling, SMOTE or ROSE (Subudhi and Panigrahi, 2017;
Van Vlasselaer et al., 2016; Sundarkumar and Ravi, 2015). In a semi-supervised approach,
Botelho and Antunes (2011) use unlabeled data to reinforce the learning algorithm. Other
researchers strive at optimally adapting known techniques to the fraud detection problem (Li
et al., 2018) or enriching the data with alternative information. Kose et al. (2015) use machine
learning methods to incorporate expert knowledge in the fraud detection model to make the
learning of fraud patterns more interactive. Wang and Xu (2018) mine experts’ text descrip-
tions of accidents and apply deep learning to detect fraud in car insurance whereas Sˇubelj et al.
(2011) use networks to detect groups of collaborating fraudsters.
Fraudulent activity can often be associated with organized schemes carried out by collaborating
fraudsters that go to great lengths in order to hide their tracks while maximizing their gain
(Van Vlasselaer et al., 2016). In criminology, it is well known that two thirds of criminals commit
crimes together (Reiss Jr, 1988) in order to maximize their reward and to minimize the risk of
getting caught (Andresen and Felson, 2009). In particular, in organized crime, such as fraud,
social relations are of a great importance as they not only provide access to co-offenders and
profitable opportunities but also invigorate the necessary trust (Van Koppen et al., 2009). Police
departments are therefore examining criminal networks to a greater extent to detect organized
crime groups and their activity with social network analytics (Tayebi and Gla¨sser, 2016). Social
network analytics is the analysis of social structures, i.e. the ties between individuals and
organisations, using networks and graph theory (Newman, 2010). In fraud detection, this
activity can be detected for example by measuring proximity to known fraudulent cases or
exposure to fraud influence (Jamshidi and Hashemi, 2012). In a first attempt of using this
approach for fraud detection in insurance, Sˇubelj et al. (2011) argue that groups of collaborating
fraudsters can only be detected with the appropriate representation, i.e. social networks, since
they are often related to each other in some way. They use collision data from police records
to build networks, rely on expert knowledge to identify suspicious sub-networks using PRIDIT
scores and propose an iterative assessment algorithm to detect the most suspicious entities in
each sub-network.
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This paper addresses risk management in the context of insurance fraud. We propose a frame-
work to build and to evaluate an analytical fraud detection model for insurance claims. We
hereby combine the socio-demographic information about the policyholder and classic informa-
tion about the claim with information about the claim’s social network structure. The social
network connects a claim with all its involved parties, e.g., policyholders, brokers, garages and
experts, which in turn are connected to all claims they are involved in. In this way, we build a
bipartite network with a few million insurance claims and parties that is a fitting representa-
tion of the relationships between the various parties by means of the claims in which they are
involved. As such, we are able to look beyond the classical properties of the claim, the policy-
holder and the policy, and study the social structures of collaborating fraudsters in insurance
fraud detection tools and models. The network contains claims from several types of insurance
covers, e.g., motor, fire, and liability, which provides a holistic view on the customers of the
insurance company. In the actual fraud detection model, we focus on the motor line of business.
We start by establishing fraud as a social phenomenon in this network and show that fraudu-
lent claims are connected to other fraudulent claims to a greater extent. The collaboration of
fraudsters in fraud circles to hide their tracks and lower the risk of getting caught, is a funda-
mental assumption for a network based fraud detection approach, and is known as homophily
in social sciences. Homophily refers to people’s tendency to associate with others whom they
perceive as being similar to themselves in some way. In a network of claims, this means that the
fraudulent claims are more often connected to other fraudulent claims and that non-fraudulent
claims are more likely to be connected to other non-fraudulent claims. In addition, fraudulent
and non-fraudulent claims are connected to each other to a lesser degree.
Having empirical evidence of homophily, we rank the claims in the network relative to known
fraudulent claims. In essence, the goal of node ranking is to assign a score to each node in
accordance with a specific criterion. This became a prominent research topic as internet search
engines were emerging, starting with PageRank and HITS (Kleinberg, 1999; Page et al., 1999).
Applications of node ranking are omnipresent including social analysis of Twitter accounts
(Kwak et al., 2010), connectivity patterns in neuroscience (Lohmann et al., 2010) as well as
fraud detection in online lending, tax evasion and social security (Min et al., 2018; Botelho and
Antunes, 2011; Van Vlasselaer et al., 2016). We use the BiRank algorithm proposed by He
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et al. (2017) as an extension of the PageRank algorithm tailor made for bipartite networks. In
addition, inspired by Van Vlasselaer et al. (2016), we modify the BiRank algorithm by adapting
the query vector to include the knowledge of known fraudulent claims in the network. This
steers the ranking towards the fraud in the network and results in higher scores for claims that
are closer and more densely connected to known fraudulent claims. In this way, all nodes in
the network obtain a score which represents proximity to fraudulent claims. We use the scores
to compute a set of features which characterize the position of a claim in the network, such as,
the average score of all parties involved in the claim. We combine the scores and the features
from the network with the traditional features of the claim, the policyholder and the policy in
an analytical fraud detection model to flag highly suspicions claims that need to be investigated
further. The approach provides a guided and intelligent selection of claims and thus contributes
to a more effective fraud investigation process. As such, we demonstrate how to harness high-
volume, high-dimensional and multi-source data through network science. Using these data in
a predictive machine learning model allows to unravel their potential to detect and to prevent
insurance fraud via big-data analytics.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the dataset used
in this study and demonstrate how to convert it into a bipartite network. Moreover, we discuss
fraudulent structures and show empirical evidence of homophily among fraudulent claims. In
Section 3, we elaborate on our fraud detection model and in Section 4 we explain the setup of
the subsequent experiments. In Section 5, we present the results of our proposed technique and
finally, conclude our research in Section 6.
2 Insurance fraud dataset
2.1 Description of the data
We analyze a dataset with a couple of million claims filed by an insurance company’s policy-
holders over a period of a few years. Claims are formal requests sent to an insurance company
for coverage or compensation of a covered loss. The dataset includes information on the insured
event, such as the claim amount, as well as information on the policyholder and their claims
history. Our goal is to build a fraud detection model for the motor insurance cover. Therefore,
2 Insurance fraud dataset 7
Table 1 details the available features for the motor insurance claims and their meaning. We
refer to these features as intrinsic features. They are specific to the line of business (LoB) for
which the fraud detection model is designed.
In addition to the intrinsic features, each claim has a list of the people and companies involved
in the claim. These are policyholders, brokers, experts and garages. Policyholders are people
or companies that are involved in the incident in one of the following ways. A policyholder
may be covered by the insurer and request compensation using their own policy, or the policy
of another client of the insurance company. Alternatively, they may be involved in a claim
(e.g., as a victim) while not being covered by the insurance company. Insurance brokers are
individuals or companies that sell, solicit and negotiate insurance on behalf of policyholders.
Experts evaluate the loss filed via an insurance claim and garages repair damaged cars. In this
paper the term party refers to all these entities that are not claims. We use claims and involved
parties to build a network, connecting claims and parties across all available LoBs.
To establish whether a claim is fraudulent or not, it must undergo an investigation by fraud
inspectors at the insurance company. These inspectors label the claims as fraudulent or non-
fraudulent after an inquiry into the claim. However, due to time constraints and lack of re-
sources, only a small fraction of all claims undergo such an investigation. This means that most
claims are settled without an investigation. Hence, a number of fraudulent claims will remain
undetected. We refer to claims that have been investigated as known, having a known label
or as being labeled, whereas claims that were never investigated are referred to as unlabelled,
unknown, or, having an unknown label. Per year in our dataset, less than a percent of all claims
go through a formal fraud investigation with less than half resulting in a known fraud label.
2.2 A bipartite network of insurance claims and involved parties
We use the claims and the involved parties to build a bipartite network, including both open
and closed claims reported within a certain period. When a claim is filed, we link to it all the
involved parties. The involved parties in a motor insurance claim could be, e.g., the policyholder
who owns the car, the broker who solicits the claim and the garage where the car is repaired.
Furthermore, we link each party to all the claims in which this party is involved. We refer to the
network as a social network. Figure 1 shows a sample network of five claims and four parties.
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Table 1: Description of the available intrinsic features for the motor insurance claims.
Type Feature Description
Target fraud Is the claim fraudulent: yes, no or unknown.
Policyholder
characteristics
age Age of policyholder when incident occurred.
responsibilityCode Policyholder’s responsibility in the incident: at fault, shared responsibility or
full right.
numContracts Number of contracts the policyholder has or has had with the insurer.
claimAge Number of months from beginning of contract to the date the incident oc-
curred.
nClaims1 Number of claims across all LoBs in the last year before the incident occurred.
nClaims5 Number of claims across all LoBs in the last 5 years before incident occurred.
lastClaim Number of months since the last claim occurrence.
amount1 Claimed amount across all LoBs in the last year before current claim occur-
rence.
amount5 Claimed amount across all LoBs in the last 5 years before current claim oc-
currence.
refused1 Number of times compensation was refused in the last year before current
claim occurrence.
refused5 Number of times compensation was refused in the last 5 years before current
claim occurrence.
atfault1 Number of times the policyholder had responsibility code ‘at fault’ in the last
year before current claim occurrence.
atfault5 Number of times the policyholder had responsibility code ‘at fault’ in the last
5 years before current claim occurrence.
samesits1 Number of times the policyholder had the same responsibility code as the
current claim in the last year before current claim occurrence.
samesits5 Number of times the policyholder had the same responsibility code as the
current claim in the last 5 years before current claim occurrence.
Claim
characteristics
claimAge Number of months from beginning of contract to the date the incident oc-
curred.
people Number of people involved in the claim.
company Number of companies involved in the claim.
police Police was called when the incident happened: yes or no.
daysReport Number of days from the occurrence of incident to the filing of the claim.
amount The claimed amount for closed claims or the expected claimed amount if the
claim is still open.
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C1
P1
C2
P4
P3
P2
C3
C4
C5
Figure 1: A sample network of claims and parties. The circles are claims and the rectangles are parties.
The nodes connected with blue edges form a 4-cycle and the nodes connected with orange
edges form a 6-cycle.
Claim C1 is linked to its involved parties, P1, P2 and P3. Each party is then also linked to the
claims that they are involved in. Party P1 is linked to claim C2, party P2 is linked to claim
C3, and party P3 is linked to claims C3, C4 and C5. This network is not restricted to motor
insurance claims only, but includes claims from all lines of business in the non-life sector of the
insurance company, i.e., motor, fire, liability and work accidents. As such, the social network
represents a holistic view on the riskiness of clients.
The network is a bipartite network because it is composed of two types of nodes, i.e., claims (C)
and parties (P ), with no edges between nodes of the same type. Formally, we let G = (C∪P,E)
be a bipartite network of nodes C ∪ P and edges E. Each node belongs to exactly one of the
sets C and P and each edge in E connects one node in C to one node in P (Newman, 2010).
The nodes in the set C correspond to insurance claims and the nodes in P are the various
parties involved in the claims, that is, the policyholders, brokers, experts and garages. We
let nC be the number of nodes in C and denote individual nodes, i.e. claims, with ci where
i ∈ {1, . . . , nC}. Similarly, nP is the number of nodes in P and individual nodes, i.e. parties,
are given by pj , j ∈ {1, . . . , nP }. The network’s edges carry weights to indicate the strength of
the connection between the two nodes they connect. All the edges are represented collectively
by a weight matrix W = (wij), where i ∈ {1, . . . , nC}, j ∈ {1, . . . , nP }, with nC rows and nP
columns, corresponding to the nodes in C and P respectively. Thus, if node ci is connected to
node pj the value of wij is positive and zero otherwise. When the network is unweighted, all
non-zero values in W are equal to one. The network is undirected as no direction is given to
the edges, that is wij = wji,∀i, j ∈ nC ∪ nP .
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The k-th order neighborhood of a node ci, denoted with N kci , is the set of all nodes that are
connected to ci, via a path of exactly k edges. Thus, the first order neighborhood of a claim ci
is the set of all parties that are involved in the claim, or
N 1ci = {pj |wij 6= 0},
whereas the second order neighborhood of a claim is the set of all claims that are involved in
the parties in N 1ci , or
N 2ci = {ck|pj ∈ N 1ck ∧ wkj 6= 0} \ ci.
The degree of a node, denoted with di for claim ci or dj for party pj , is the number of nodes in
the node’s first order neighborhood for an unweighted network and the sum of weights on the
edges between the node and the nodes in its first order neighborhood for a weighted network.
We use the diagonal matrix DC to denote the degree of all claims, i.e., (DC)ii = di, and
similarly, the diagonal matrix DP for the degree of all parties. The matrices DC and DP are
square matrices of orders nC and nP , respectively.
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the nodes and edges in the network. Set C contains only
one type of nodes, namely the claims. The average and median of the number of parties involved
in a claim is 3.79 and 3, respectively. There are four types of party nodes, namely, policyholders,
brokers, experts and garages. With a relative frequency of 96.36%, policyholders are the most
common parties and they are connected to two claims on average. Broker nodes have a relative
frequency of only 0.39% and yet some of them are very important in the network as is shown by
their high edge relative frequency. Out of all the edges, 27.82% are connected to a broker and
the broker degree ranges from one to almost twenty thousand. Experts show a similar trend in
terms of node relative frequency, but their edge relative frequency is lower. Finally, although
there is a higher number of garages, their connectivity is less than that of brokers and experts.
This can be explained by the fact that garages are almost only relevant for motor claims, while
our network also incorporates other LoBs.
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Table 2: Summary statistics of nodes and edges in the sets C and P . The column Nodes shows the
relative frequency of a specific node type within the set of parties. Similarly, the column Edges
shows the relative frequency of edges connected to the respective node type in the set of all
edges. As an edge always connects one claim and one party, the edge can be attributed to just
the party, as is done in this table.
Set Type Nodes Edges
Mean
degree
Median
degree
Min
degree
Max
degree
C Claim - - 3.79 3 1 42
P
Policyholder 0.9636 0.4908 2.06 1 1 20274
Broker 0.0039 0.2782 261.00 42 1 19830
Expert 0.0037 0.1513 148.00 1 1 125951
Garage 0.0288 0.0797 10.10 1 1 10436
C1 C2
P1
P2
C1 C2
P1
P2
C1 C2
P1
P2
Figure 2: 4-cycles with zero (left), one (middle) or two (right) fraudulent claims. Fraudulent claims
are colored dark gray and non-fraudulent claims are white.
2.3 Fraudulent structures
A cycle in a network is a set of nodes connected via edges, where all nodes and edges are distinct
and the last node is connected to the first node (Newman, 2010). In Figure 1, C1, P2, C3 and
P3 form a four node cycle (blue edges), also called a 4-cycle. In addition, since claims C2 and
C5 are both linked to party P4 there is a cycle of six nodes, made up of C1, P1, C2, P4, C5 and
P3 (orange edges). We refer to these cycles as 6-cycles. These cyclic structures are examples of
incidents involving multiple policyholders who file claims together.
The most simple structure in a bipartite network is a 4-cycle, as seen in Figure 2 where white
and dark gray circles represent non-fraudulent and fraudulent claims, respectively. In these
structures zero, one or both claims can be fraudulent. Table 3 shows the relative frequency of
each type of 4-cycle among all 4-cycles with known labels in our network. For 4-cycles where
both party nodes are people (policyholder, broker or expert), over 70% have two fraudulent
claims, 16.33% of 4-cycles have two legitimate claims and 12.24% have one claim with each
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Table 3: Relative frequency of 4-cycles with zero, one and two fraudulent claims among 4-cycles with
known labels.
Party nodes
Two people One person & one
company
Total
Number of
fraudulent claim
nodes
Zero 16.33% 36.56% 35.66%
One 12.24% 30.29% 29.47%
Both 71.43% 33.15% 34.87%
C1
C2 C3
P1
P2
P3
C1
C2 C3
P1
P2
P3
C1
C2 C3
P1
P2
P3
C1
C2 C3
P1
P2
P3
Figure 3: 6-cycles with zero, one, two and three fraudulent claims (from left to right). Fraudulent
claims are colored dark gray and non-fradulent claims are white.
label. Including 4-cycles where one of the parties can be a company, 34.87% and 35.66% of
all 4-cycles have two fraudulent and two non-fraudulent nodes, respectively. In contrast, with
a relative frequency of 29.47%, the ratio of 4-cycles with one claim of each label is lower. As
such, in the 4-cycles with all labelled claims, fraudulent as well as non-fraudulent claims group
together to some extent.
6-cycles can have zero, one, two or three fraudulent claims, as seen in Figure 3. We extract from
the network all 6-cycles where all the claims have a known label and look at the distribution of
fraudulent and non-fraudulent labels in these 6-cycles. When a labelled claim is part of such a
6-cycle, fraudulent claims appear on average in 1.6 6-cycles whereas non-fraudulent claims are
on average in 1.4 6-cycles. Among all 6-cycles with at least one fraudulent claim, the relative
frequency of 6-cycles with one, two and three fraudulent claims is 42.13%, 46.88% and 10.69%,
respectively. Similarly, among all 6-cycles with at least one non-fraudulent claim, the relative
frequency of 6-cycles with zero, one and two fraudulent claims is equal to 20.86%, 61.64%
and 17.36%, respectively. As such, both fraudulent and non-fraudulent claims tend to group
together in 6-cycles.
Table 4 shows the relative frequency of fraudulent and non-fraudulent claims in the second and
fourth order neighborhoods of claims with a known label. Hereto, we calculate for each labelled
claim the ratio of fraudulent and non-fraudulent claims relative to the size of the respective
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Table 4: Relative frequency of fraudulent and non-fraudulent claims among all claims in the second
and fourth order neighborhoods of labelled claims.
Relative frequency
Neighborhood Label Fraudulent claims Non-fraudulent claims
Second order
Non-fraudulent 0.154% 0.394%
Fraudulent 0.269% 0.223%
Fourth order
Non-fraudulent 0.0884% 0.196%
Fraudulent 0.0894% 0.135%
neighborhood, that is, including the unknown claims as well. In the second order neighborhood
of non-fraudulent claims the ratio of non-fraudulent claims is 0.394%, on average, and the ratio
of fraudulent claims is 0.154%, on average. In contrast, for fraudulent claims, the ratio of non-
fraudulent claims is 0.223%, an average, and the ratio of fraudulent claims is 0.269%, on average,
in the second order neighborhood. More fraudulent claims than non-fraudulent claims appear
in the neighborhood of fraudulent claims and vice versa for the neighborhood of non-fraudulent
claims. In the fourth order neighborhood, this also holds for non-fraudulent claims, but not for
the fraudulent ones.
We find some empirical evidence of structural similarities in the network among fraudulent
claims on the one hand and among non-fraudulent claims on the other hand. Claims with
the same label tend to be more connected to each other. In addition, the claims with opposite
labels are less connected to each other. This establishes some evidence for homophily, especially
among the fraudulent claims (Park and Baraba´si, 2007).
However, finding new (yet undetected) fraudulent claims through exploration of the network
alone is a complex task as Figure 4 illustrates. This excerpt from the real network shows
ten parties and seven claims of which four are fraudulent (dark gray), two are non-fraudulent
(white) and one is unknown (light gray). The expert on the left side is involved in 26 claims
where six are known fraudulent and eleven are known non-fraudulent. The garage on the right
has 501 claims where six are labelled as fraudulent and four are labelled as non-fraudulent. Let
C1 be a new claim that the claim handlers need to screen to decide whether it is suspicious
or not. From the intrinsic features in Table 1 they can easily see that the policyholder has an
older fraudulent claim. However, detecting the influence of other nodes in the network on the
claim’s fraud propensity is not obvious, and requires taking the network structure into account.
For example, in this excerpt, C1 is only three edges away from the expert on the left who has
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C1 Broker C2
Garage
Policyholder
Garage
C3
C4
C5
Expert
C6
Policyholder
Broker
Garage
Expert
C7
Broker
Claims: 501
Fraudulent: 6
Non-fraudulent: 4
Claims: 26
Fraudulent: 6
Non-fraudulent: 11
Figure 4: Excerpt from the real network, illustrating the network’s complexity. In the network, the
dark gray, light gray and white circles represent fraudulent, unknown and non-fraudulent
claims, respectively. The nodes connected with blue edges form a 4-cycle and the nodes
connected with orange edges form a 6-cycle.
a number of fraudulent claims. Moreover, the broker on the right is part of the first order
neighborhood of C1 while being connected to a proven fraudulent claim involving a garage with
a dubious reputation. Claim C1 forms a 4-cycle with the fraudulent claim C3 and a 6-cycle
with fraudulent claim C3 and the non-fraudulent claim C5. Similarly, claim C2 is connected
to a garage involved in 501 claims. It would not be feasible for the claim handlers to look at
all those claims to establish connections to known fraudulent claims and to unravel structures
such as the 4-cycle that exists between claims C6 and C7.
This example illustrates the complexity of manually exploring the network to find fraudulent
claims and motivates the need for a more automated approach.
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3 Supervised learning with intrinsic and network derived fea-
tures
We develop an analytical model for flagging suspicious claims inspired by our empirical findings
of homophily among the fraudulent claims in the network. In Section 3.1, we use a ranking
algorithm based on the personalized PageRank of Page et al. (1999) to score the nodes in the
network with respect to their exposure to known fraudulent claims. We then extract features
from the network in Section 3.2 and combine them with the intrinsic features listed in Table 1
in a predictive model to identify the most suspicious claims in Section 3.3.
3.1 Computing fraud scores
The key principle of PageRank is to score —and as such to rank— a node in a network based
on both the number of connecting nodes as well as the rank of the nodes that provide these
connections. The algorithm can be personalized to bring out nodes that are important from
the perspective of a specific set of source nodes, such as the known fraudulent claims in our
problem setting. The resulting scores are then biased or personalized towards the source nodes,
reflecting a preference for these nodes. He et al. (2017) formalized the (personalized) ranking
of nodes in a bipartite network. We apply their BiRank algorithm to our network of claims and
parties.
3.1.1 BiRank algorithm
The BiRank algorithm takes as inputs a network and a query vector and calculates a score or
ranking for each node in the network. The query vector encodes some prior knowledge, such as
fraud. In what follows, we use ci and pj to denote the score of node ci and pj , respectively. The
collection of scores across all claim nodes is stored in c, while p is the vector with the scores of
the nodes of type party.
BiRank iteratively computes a node’s score as a sum of the scores from the connected nodes.
Let wij be a non-negative number expressing the weight on the edge between nodes ci and pj ,
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where wij is 0 if the nodes are unconnected. Then
ci =
nP∑
j=1
wijpj and pj =
nC∑
i=1
wijci
for claims and parties, respectively. To ensure convergence and stability, He et al. (2017) propose
a symmetric normalization that smooths the edge weight by the degree of the two connected
nodes simultaneously. This gives the normalized scores
ci =
nP∑
j=1
wij√
di
√
dj
pj and pj =
nC∑
i=1
wij√
di
√
dj
ci (1)
where di (respectively dj) is the degree of node ci (respectively pj), as introduced in Section
2.2. The normalization dampens the contribution of high degree nodes and gives better quality
results (He et al., 2017).
Query vectors incorporate prior information or belief in the node ranking, and steer it towards
the fraudulent claims, by factoring them directly into the ranking process. Let c0 and p0 be
query vectors of length nC , respectively nP , for the claims and parties. To incorporate the
query vectors into the ranking we expand (1) as
ci = α
nP∑
j=1
wij√
di
√
dj
pj + (1− α)c0i and pj = β
nC∑
i=1
wij√
di
√
dj
ci + (1− β)p0j (2)
where α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1] are parameters that control the trade-off between the importance
of the network structure and the query vector. Writing the BiRank equation (2) in matrix form
gives
c = αSp+ (1− α)c0 and p = βST c+ (1− β)p0, (3)
where S = D
− 1
2
C WD
− 1
2
P is the symmetrically normalized weight matrix. When using the
BiRank algorithm to compute fraud scores, the ranking vectors c and p are first randomly
initialized and then computed iteratively until convergence to a unique stationary point, which
is theoretically guaranteed as outlined in (He et al., 2017).
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3.1.2 Fraud specialized query vector
In our insurance context, the goal is to rank the nodes relative to fraud using the information
about known fraudulent claims to guide the process. The strategy is inspired by Van Vlasselaer
et al. (2016) who used traditional personalized PageRank (instead of BiRank) to propagate
fraud through the network. Most of the claim nodes in the network have an unknown label, but
we use the known fraudulent claims as prior information in the query vector. However, only
claims can be fraudulent, not parties. Therefore, we identify prior information for the nodes
in C via c0, while p0 ≡ 0. We adjust (3) accordingly and set β = 1, since only the network
structure matters in the absence of the query vector. This gives
c = αSp+ (1− α)c0 and p = ST c.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the update rules for the iterative BiRank algorithm. These rules are
repeated until either the relative change in scores between two iterations is below a certain
threshold or a maximum number of iterations is reached.
Algorithm 1: BiRank algorithm for computing fraud scores in a network of insurance claims
and parties. Adapted from Algorithm 1 in (He et al., 2017). We omit the query vector p0 and
set β = 1.
Input: Weight matrix W , query vector c0 and hyperparameter α;
Output: Ranking vectors c and p;
1 Symmetrically normalize W : S = D
− 1
2
P WD
− 1
2
C ;
2 Randomly initialize c and p;
3 while stopping criteria is not met do
4 c← αSp+ (1− α)c0;
5 p← ST c ;
6 return c and p;
Figure 5 revisits the sample network in Figure 1 and shows the network before and after applying
the BiRank algorithm with a query vector for fraud. Claim C4 is known to be fraudulent and
claim C2 is known to be non-fraudulent. The other claims have an unknown label. The query
vector specifies claim C1 as fraudulent, i.e., c04 = 1, while the other claims do not contribute any
information in the query vector, i.e., c01 = c
0
2 = c
0
3 = c
0
5 = 0. We set α = 0.85 in Algorithm 1.
After running the BiRank algorithm on this unweighted network, all nodes obtain a fraud score,
indicated by the numbers in blue.
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C1
P1
C2
P4
P3
P2
C3
C4
C5
BiRank
C1
P1
C2
P4
P3
P2
C3
C4
C5
0.144
0.089
0.132
0.262
0.125
0.103
0.125
0.263
0.107
Figure 5: A sample network before and after applying the BiRank algorithm to rank the nodes with
respect to fraud. Claim C4 is a known fraud and the source of fraud influence. Node C2 is
known non-fraud. The network is unweighted and α = 0.85. The fraud scores are shown in
blue.
Table 5: Features extracted from the network structure, the labels and the fraud scores.
Name Order Description
scores0 0 The node’s fraud score
n1.q1 1 The first quartile of the empirical distribution of the fraud scores in the node’s
first order neighborhood
n1.med 1 The median of the empirical distribution of the fraud scores in the node’s first
order neighborhood
n1.max 1 The maximum of the empirical distribution of the fraud scores in the node’s
first order neighborhood
n2.q1 2 The first quartile of the empirical distribution of the fraud scores in the node’s
second order neighborhood
n2.med 2 The median of the empirical distribution of the fraud scores in the node’s
second order neighborhood
n2.max 2 The maximum of the empirical distribution of the fraud scores in the node’s
second order neighborhood
3.2 Network featurization
Based on the network structure, the labels and the computed fraud scores, we can extract several
features from the network. This process is known as network featurization. We distinguish score
features and neighborhood features as motivated in Section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, respectively. We
refer to the set of extracted features as network features.
3.2.1 Features based on fraud score
Inspired by Van Vlasselaer et al. (2016) we compute network features from the fraud scores in
the zeroth, first and second order neighborhoods of each node. Table 5 shows the list of extracted
score features. The zeroth order neighborhood of a node is the node itself and the feature we
extract is the node’s fraud score. For the first and second order neighborhood features, we look
at the distribution of the fraud scores in the respective neighborhoods of the claim and compute
three features in each case. These are the scores’ first quartile, the median and the maximum,
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Table 6: Score feature values for claim C1 in the sample network in Figure 5.
Name Order Value
scores0 0 0.1440
n1.q1 1 0.1140
n1.med 1 0.1250
n1.max 1 0.2630
n2.q1 2 0.1160
n2.med 2 0.1285
n2.max 2 0.2620
Table 7: Features extracted from the neighborhood structure and the labels.
Name Order Description
n1.size 1 The number of nodes in the node’s first order neighborhood
n2.size 2 The number of nodes in the node’s second order neighborhood
n2.ratioFraud 2 The number of known fraudulent claims in the node’s second order neighbor-
hood divided by n2.size
n2.ratioNonFraud 2 The number of known non-fraudulent claims in the node’s second order neigh-
borhood divided by n2.size
n2.binFraud 2 A binary value indicating whether there is a known fraudulent claim in the
node’s second order neighborhood
capturing the variation in the exposure to fraud. For example, a high maximum indicates close
proximity to at least one fraudulent node whereas a high first quartile indicates proximity to
several fraudulent nodes. The first order neighborhood typically consists of only a few nodes
whereas the second order neighborhood is much larger and thus provides more variation in
scores and the resulting features. For example, returning to the sample network in Figure 5,
claim C1 has the score feature values shown in Table 6.
3.2.2 Features based on neighborhood
Table 7 lists the extracted neighborhood features. First, we look at the number of nodes in a
node’s neighborhood. The size of the first order neighborhood is the number of parties that
are involved in the claim while the size of the second order neighborhood is the number of
claims in which these involved parties are engaged in. Second, following the framework of Lu
and Getoor (2003) we compute three so-called link-based features using the labels of claims in
a node’s second order neighborhood. These are the ratio of known fraudulent as well as non-
fraudulent claims, versus the size of the neighborhood. These represent the homophilic nature
of fraud. The third feature indicates whether one of the involved parties is linked to a fraudulent
claim, i.e., whether there is a fraudulent claim in its second order neighborhood. This feature
is one of the business rules used by the insurance company to flag suspicious claims for further
3 Supervised learning with intrinsic and network derived features 20
Table 8: Neighborhood feature values for claim C1 in the sample network in Figure 5.
Name Order Value
n1.size 1 3
n2.size 2 4
n2.ratioFraud 2 0.25
n2.ratioNonFraud 2 0.25
n2.binFraud 2 1
investigation. The values of the extracted neighborhood features for claim C1 in Figure 5 are
listed in Table 8.
3.3 Fraud analytical model
We build a supervised learning model to detect suspicious claims. The model can use features
from three groups; the intrinsic features described in Section 2.1, the score features and the
neighborhood features described in Section 3.2. The features in each group are denoted with
xintr, xscore and xnbh, respectively.
Three different labels are present in the data, namely fraud, non-fraud and unknown. We adopt
a one-vs.-all classification strategy by transforming the label to a binary target feature (Bishop,
2006). We do this in two ways. First, we build a model that distinguishes claims with a known
label from those with an unknown label. Hereto, we create the target feature yknown by setting
yknowni =
 1 ⇔ li ∈ {fraud, non-fraud}0 ⇔ li ∈ {unknown},
with li the label of claim ci. This results in the dataset Dknown with features and target
x = {xintr, xscore, xnnbh}, y = yknown.
The claims where the target feature equals 1, are the claims that underwent a fraud investigation.
These claims were considered suspicious by the claim handlers, possibly because they fulfilled
some of the currently implemented business rules to highlight fraud. Analysis of this dataset will
give insights into how claims are selected for further investigation at the insurance company.
The findings of a supervised learning model for yknown may also inspire the creation of new,
additional business rules.
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Second, we build a model that distinguishes claims with a known fraud label from the rest of
the claims. We create the target feature yfraud by setting
yfraudi =
 1 ⇔ li ∈ {fraud}0 ⇔ li ∈ {non-fraud, unknown}.
This results in the dataset Dfraud with features and target
x = {xintr, xscore, xnnbh}, y = yfraud.
This dataset will help in distinguishing fraudulent claims from the rest of the claims. We use it
to investigate which features are discriminative for fraud.
We analyze the data sets Dknown and Dfraud with two supervised learning techniques, namely
logistic regression and random forests.
Logistic regression is a statistical technique used to model the probability of a certain event or
class, in our case whether a given claim is fraudulent. Given a training set, logistic regression
expresses the probability of success, P (fraud), as follows:
P (fraud) =
1
1 + e−(b0+
∑
bjxj)
where xj are the features in the data set and b0, bj are the parameters to be estimated by the
model. We focus on logistic regression for model building because of its popularity in the insur-
ance industry and its interpretability. This is in line with our goal to understand which features
are predictive for the occurrence of the target variable. These discriminative characteristics can
then be transferred into business rules that claim handlers can easily understand and deploy
when deciding whether an incoming claim should be flagged for investigation.
In contrast, random forests are powerful ensemble models that are capable of discovering com-
plex patterns in the data (Breiman, 2001). Ensemble methods estimate multiple models instead
of using just one. Random forests create a bag (called ‘forest’) of decision trees during training
that together predict the outcome. To avoid overfitting, random forests feature additional ele-
ments of randomness. Firstly, each decision tree is trained on a bootstrap copy of the training
data set. Secondly, when performing splits of nodes in the decision trees, only a random subset
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of features is considered. In this way, diverse and independent base models are created. To make
a prediction, the random forest outputs the class that the majority of the trees predicted. This
results in reduced generalization error of the prediction of the final model. Random forests are
black box models, because it is not obvious how a prediction is made. However, by investigating
which features tend to give informative splits in the decision trees, it is possible to estimate
their importance with respect to predicting the target outcome. As we have multiple and varied
features, we use random forests to evaluate their importance before applying logistic regression
to the most informative features.
3.4 Model evaluation
We select three measures to evaluate the performance of the fraud models as described below.
Receiver operating characteristic curve The area under the receiver operating character-
istic curve (AUROC) is commonly used to measure the performance of binary classifiers (Hanley
and McNeil, 1982). It measures the trade-off between the model’s recall (or sensitivity) and
specificity while varying the cut-off that determines whether an instance is classified as good
or bad by the model. It summarizes the performance in a single number between 0.5 (random
model) and 1 (perfect model), where a higher value indicates a better performance. For fraud,
recall measures the ratio between fraudulent claims that are detected by the model and the total
number of fraudulent claims. Specificity, on the other hand, is the number of non-fraudulent
claims that the model predicts as non-fraudulent divided by the number of non-fraudulent claims
in the data.
Precision-Recall curve The area under the precision-recall curve (AUPR) is a performance
measure for binary classifiers that is useful when the class distribution of the dataset is im-
balanced (Saito and Rehmsmeier, 2015). In contrast to AUROC, it is based on the model’s
precision and recall. In fraud detection, precision measures the ratio of fraudulent claims that
are detected by the model and the number of claims that the model predicts as fraudulent. The
precision-recall curve shows the trade-off between the recall and the precision and represents the
model’s performance independent of the cut-off. The area under the curve, AUPR, summarizes
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the curve in a single number. The AUPR of a perfect model is one whereas AUPR of a random
model equals the ratio of the positive class or, in our case, the fraud ratio.
Top decile lift Lift is a performance measure that represents how much better a model
is at detecting fraudulent claims than a random model (Lemmens and Croux, 2006; Verbeke
et al., 2014). The top decile lift (TDL), for example, is computed by dividing the proportion
of fraudulent claims among the 10% of claims with the highest predicted probability with the
relative frequency of the fraudulent claims in the dataset. A random model has TDL equal to
one, and increasing TDL values indicate a better performance. The TDL performance measure
is valuable from a managerial perspective as it focuses on the most critical group of claims, i.e.,
those with the highest fraud probability. It enables us to control whether the targeted segment
of suspicous claims indeed contains actual fraudulent claims.
4 Experimental set up
To evaluate the performance of our proposed technique, we set up experiments reflecting the
deployment of the model in practice. Our goal is to compare the intrinsic, score and neighbor-
hood features in their ability to detect fraud on the one hand and labelled claims on the other
hand. We first apply the BiRank algorithm to calculate fraud scores, then we extract network
features and finally we build predictive models using intrinsic and neighborhood features as well
as score features.
Our model evaluation procedure requires careful design since it has to reflect the use and
limitations of the predictive model in a practical setting. For example, when calculating the
fraud scores the fraudulent claims that serve as the source of information in the query vector
c0, will by design obtain a high score when the BiRank algorithm is applied. Therefore, they
can not be included in the dataset for which we build the supervised fraud detection model. To
circumvent this problem, and to reflect how the model would be deployed in reality, we view
the older claims as historic data and include fraud information about older fraudulent claims in
the query vector c0. However, we use the newer claims as targets when building the analytical
model.
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(b) Application of the BiRank alogrithm
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(c) Nodes with fraud scores
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(d) The most recent nodes
Figure 6: The set up for the BiRank algorithm and feature extraction. Red, green and gray circles
represent fraudulent, non-fraudulent and unknown claims respectively. Rectangles represent
parties. Whole and dashed lines around claims represent older and newer claims. Fraud
scores are in blue.
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Computation of fraud scores and network featurization The procedure to compute
the fraud scores is shown in Figure 6. The claims in the data span a period of six years and
we use all these claims and the involved parties to build the network. This is shown in Figure
6a. We use the first five years of the observation period as historic knowledge about fraud and
the last, most recent, observation year for model building and evaluation. Red, green and gray
nodes denote claims with the labels fraud, non-fraud and unknown, respectively. The rectangles
denote the parties. A dashed line around a node means it was filed in the first five years and a
whole line indicates the claim was filed in the most recent year.
We apply the BiRank algorithm, where the fraud specialised query vector c0 contains informa-
tion about the known fraudulent claims of the first five years only. Figure 6b shows how the
fraud influence originates from the red fraud nodes with dashed border and spreads through
the network as the red arrows indicate. After the algorithm is applied, all nodes obtain a score.
This is indicated in Figure 6c.
Our analytical model uses only the claims that were filed in the most recent year. Therefore,
we extract score and neighborhood features as described in Section 3.2 for these claims only,
see Figure 6d, and use these in our model building and evaluation.
Analytical model The datasets Dknown and Dfraud are created by combining all labelled
claims with a random sample of about 20 thousand claims that were filed in the most recent
year. We start by setting aside a test set from both Dknown and Dfraud. They contain a random
sample with 30% of the observations in each dataset while maintaining the original class balance.
These datasets are used when measuring the out-of-sample performance of the final models. The
remaining 70% of the observations make up the training datasets.
The training datasets are highly imbalanced, with a 4.9% and 1.8% minority class rate in Dknown
and Dfraud, respectively. We use the SMOTE sampling technique to over sample the minority
class and under sample the majority class (Chawla et al., 2002). As such, the ratio of the
minority class in each sampled dataset is increased to 15%. We use these sampled datasets to
evaluate the features’ importance using random forests. We first tune the hyper-parameters of
the random forests using ten-fold cross-validation on the training sets. We use grid search to find
the optimal parameter values for the number of trees in the forest and the number of features
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sampled in each split. The search spaces for these two parameters are {100, 300, 500, 700, 900}
trees and {1, 3, . . . ,NoF} features, where NoF is the number of features being considered. Using
the optimal parameter values, we build random forest models for each of the two datasets and
each feature group xintr, xscore and xnbh. We then assess the importance of each feature in the
constructed models. Subsequently, we build logistic regression models where we add one feature
at a time based on the features’ importance, starting with the most important one. To evaluate
the performance of these logistic regression models we again use ten-fold cross-validation on the
training sets. We inspect the performance increase when stepwise adding features. Finally, we
build logistic regression models on the complete training set with the best performing features
and evaluate the performance on the test datasets.
5 Results
5.1 Performance of features
The four plots in Figure 7 show the feature importance for each group of features (xintr, xscore
and xnbh) and each dataset (Dknown and Dfraud). We normalize the feature importance values
such that they sum to one to give a clear indication of the relative contribution of each feature.
The red bars denote the feature importance for the dataset Dfraud and the green bars refer to
the dataset Dknown.
We detect some clear differences between the two datasets when using only intrinsic features.
The features amount, daysReport and police are relatively more important in the dataset
Dknown, whereas the features claimAge, numContracts and pAge are more important in Dfraud.
The most important score features for the dataset Dknown are the maximum scores in the first
and second order neighborhood, whereas the fraud score is most important for Dfraud. For the
neighborhood features, the difference in feature importance between the two datasets is less
obvious. However, we observe clear differences in the importance of features when they are
combined in the random forest models. The most important features for the dataset Dknown
are intrinsic features, e.g., amount, daysReport, numContracts, pAge and police, whereas the
most important features for Dfraud are score and neighborhood features, most notably scores0,
n1.size and n1.q1. Furthermore, intrinsic features are overall more important in Dknown than
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Figure 7: The importance of features in the random forest models using the two datasets (Dknown and
Dfraud) and the four groups of features (xintr, xscore and xnbh).
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Table 9: Significant features in the logistic regression models with only intrinsic features.
Dknown Dfraud
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(> |z|) Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(> |z|)
(Intercept) -2.2511 0.0372 -60.57 0.0000 (Intercept) -1.9177 0.0521 -36.83 0.0000
amount 0.1770 0.0269 6.59 0.0000 numContracts 0.1043 0.0468 2.23 0.0257
daysReport -0.6346 0.0314 -20.24 0.0000 amount 0.3627 0.0451 8.04 0.0000
claimAge -0.3509 0.0328 -10.70 0.0000 claimAge -0.4830 0.0517 -9.34 0.0000
pAge -0.0443 0.0305 -1.45 0.1461 daysReport -0.2937 0.0482 -6.09 0.0000
numContracts 0.2422 0.0290 8.36 0.0000 atfault5 0.2727 0.0901 3.03 0.0025
nClaims5 -0.1788 0.0860 -2.08 0.0375 samesits5 -0.2994 0.0923 -3.24 0.0012
atfault5 -0.2319 0.0945 -2.45 0.0141
police1 1.4167 0.0645 21.98 0.0000
amount5 0.1805 0.0673 2.68 0.0074
samesits5 0.1903 0.0664 2.87 0.0041
Table 10: Significant features in the logistic regression models with only score features.
Dknown Dfraud
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(> |z|) Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(> |z|)
(Intercept) -1.7427 0.0276 -63.12 0.0000 (Intercept) -1.9211 0.0521 -36.86 0.0000
n2.max 0.3075 0.0435 7.07 0.0000 scores0 0.2697 0.0558 4.83 0.0000
n1.max -0.1042 0.0365 -2.85 0.0043 n1.max 0.3615 0.0487 7.43 0.0000
scores0 0.1847 0.0246 7.50 0.0000 n2.med 1.2744 0.2926 4.35 0.0000
n2.med -0.4620 0.1618 -2.86 0.0043 n2.q1 -0.8991 0.2831 -3.18 0.0015
n1.1q -0.2348 0.0400 -5.88 0.0000 n1.1q -0.2336 0.0940 -2.48 0.0130
n2.q1 0.5190 0.1660 3.13 0.0018 n1.med -0.1321 0.0769 -1.72 0.0858
in Dfraud, while score features matter more in Dfraud than in Dknown.
Next we evaluate the prediction of the target in each dataset using logistic regression with the
most important features. We start by including only the most important feature and then add
the features in decreasing order of importance according to the random forest models previously
constructed. The plots in Figure 8 show the performance measured in AUROC, AUPR and
TDL evaluated via ten-fold cross-validation on the constructed training sets. Clearly, in Dknown
the performance of the model with only intrinsic features is greater than in Dfraud. In contrast,
the models using only score and neighborhood features perform better in Dfraud compared to
Dknown.
Table 11: Significant features in the logistic regression models with only neighborhood features.
Dknown Dfraud
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(> |z|) Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(> |z|)
(Intercept) -2.4184 0.0912 -26.51 0.0000 (Intercept) -2.1173 0.0587 -36.07 0.0000
n1.size 0.6111 0.0407 15.02 0.0000 n1.size 1.1005 0.0740 14.87 0.0000
n2.size -0.7372 0.0466 -15.84 0.0000 n2.size -0.6127 0.0726 -8.44 0.0000
n2.ratioNonFraud 0.3002 0.0281 10.67 0.0000 n2.ratioNonFraud 0.3464 0.0444 7.80 0.0000
n2.ratioFraud 0.0971 0.0281 3.46 0.0005 n2.ratioFraud 0.3621 0.0495 7.32 0.0000
n2.binFraud 0.7459 0.1017 7.34 0.0000
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(a) AUROC evaluated via ten-fold cross-validation on the training sets.
(b) AUPR evaluated via ten-fold cross-validation on the training sets.
(c) TDL evaluated via ten-fold cross-validation on the training sets.
Figure 8: The performance of logistic regression models for the two datasets (Dknown and Dfraud) and
the four groups of features (xintr, xscore and xnbh). We add the features in decreasing order of
importance, starting with the most important feature according to the random forest models
previously constructed.
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Table 12: Significant features in the logistic regression models with all features.
Dknown Dfraud
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(> |z|) Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(> |z|)
(Intercept) -2.5352 0.0436 -58.15 0.0000 (Intercept) -2.3559 0.0657 -35.86 0.0000
amount 0.1040 0.0274 3.80 0.0001 n1.size 1.1768 0.0789 14.92 0.0000
daysReport -0.7116 0.0355 -20.05 0.0000 n2.ratioNonFraud 0.2645 0.0446 5.93 0.0000
n1.size 0.6186 0.0468 13.23 0.0000 n1.max 1.2969 0.1129 11.49 0.0000
n2.size -2.1622 0.0972 -22.23 0.0000 amount 0.1840 0.0466 3.95 0.0001
pAge -0.0539 0.0321 -1.68 0.0931 n2.ratioFraud -0.1251 0.0662 -1.89 0.0590
numContracts 0.1874 0.0304 6.17 0.0000 claimAge -0.3384 0.0528 -6.41 0.0000
police1 1.5206 0.0687 22.13 0.0000 n2.size -2.2489 0.1620 -13.88 0.0000
claimAge -0.2967 0.0334 -8.89 0.0000 n1.med 0.0890 0.0551 1.62 0.1060
n2.ratioFraud -0.1833 0.0424 -4.33 0.0000 n2.max 0.5301 0.0991 5.35 0.0000
n2.ratioNonFraud 0.1441 0.0312 4.62 0.0000
n2.max 0.7173 0.0565 12.70 0.0000
n1.max 0.9963 0.0727 13.71 0.0000
The final models are found using stepwise logistic regression with a combination of forward and
backward selection of features on the training sets. Tables 9, 10, 11 and 12 show the results
for the two datasets and the four groups of features. Less features are significant in the models
for Dfraud compared to Dknown. The score features dominate the logistic regression model for
Dfraud fitted on the combined set of all features.
Even though multi-collinearity of the features, in particular the extracted network features,
complicates the interpretation of the sign and size of a calibrated effect, we extract some in-
teresting findings from the output of the logistic regression models. Notably, in the intrinsic
features models, see Table 9, atfault5 and samesits5 have opposite effects in the two datasets.
For example, atfault5 has a negative coefficient in Dknown, but a positive coefficient in Dfraud.
Policyholders who have been at fault in multiple claims in the past years are more likely to
file another fraudulent claim. Similarly, samesits5 has a positive coefficient in Dknown but a
negative coefficient in Dfraud. In addition, the feature police1, which indicates that the police
was called to the scene of the incident, is significant with a positive sign in Dknown but it is not
significant in Dfraud.
Table 10 shows the results for the models with only score features, where for example both
maximum statistics are significant in Dknown. They are also the most important features ac-
cording to the random forest model. In Dfraud, the scores0 feature is most important and has
a positive coefficient, which indicates that a higher fraud score detects fraudulent claims to a
greater extent. Comparing these results to Figure 8 the scores0 feature has a lot of predictive
power on its own, as it is the first feature that is added to the model. The performance drops
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Table 13: Performance of the four models on the test datasets.
Dknown Dfraud
Features AUROC AUPR TDL AUROC AUPR TDL
Intrinsic 0.691 0.1214 2.85 0.662 0.0301 2.137
Score 0.634 0.0883 2.25 0.660 0.0402 2.812
Neighborhood 0.681 0.1051 2.65 0.719 0.0481 3.262
All 0.725 0.1312 3.457 0.792 0.0810 3.824
when more features are added, due to the multi-collinearity of the score features.
For the neighborhood features in Table 11, the indicator feature n2.binFraud is significant for
detecting the labeled claims but not for detecting fraudulent claims.
Table 12 displays the results for the models with all features. In Dknown twelve features are
significant, with half of these being intrinsic features. Nine features are significant in Dfraud
and only two of them are intrinsic features.
In a final step we evaluate the logistic regression models on the test datasets. Table 13 shows
that the intrinsic model is better for dataset Dknown, while both network models perform better
on Dfraud. Combining the different types of features available leads to the best performance on
the test set, both for Dknown as well as Dfraud.
The approach is feasible for deployment as it performs well in terms of runtime. Even though
all the claims and involved parties as registered over a period of six years were used to build
the social network, running the BiRank algorithm to score the most recent claims took about
ten minutes for each value of α. The training of the algorithms (logistic regression and random
forests) is not time consuming since we work with tabular datasets with carefully engineered
features (only those listed in Tables 1, 5 and 7). The extraction of score and neighborhood
features was the most time consuming part. In practice, the model would be used to score new
claims on a weekly or monthly basis to mark suspicious claims, in which case the number of
new claims is limited and runtime reasonable.
6 Conclusion
The insurance industry is increasingly relying on data science and machine learning to provide
novel insights in its practices, such as for pricing and reserving. Insurance companies possess
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a lot of data about past claims, as well as policyholders and their claim history. In that data
lies knowledge, which goes beyond simple statistics, that can be leveraged for more accurate
data-driven predictions for the companies to better manage their practices and accommodate
their heterogeneous customer base with tailor made policies and tariffs. Data science applied
for fraud detection is another opportunity for the companies to find hidden patterns in the
data, which ultimately will help them save money and strengthen their position, by giving their
customers better service and lower tariffs.
This study presents a novel approach for fraud detection in insurance using social network
analytics. We leverage an insurance company’s database of claims, policyholders, brokers, ex-
perts and garages to build a bipartite network that represents the social structure between the
various parties involved in claims. Taking a holistic view across multiple lines of business, we
unravel stronger ties among fraudulent claims when compared to the links between fraudulent
and non-fraudulent claims. We use this empirical finding to rank claims with respect to fraud
using a personalized PageRank algorithm (in casu: BiRank with a fraud specific query vec-
tor). The resulting fraud scores bring added value when detecting fraud and so are the score
neighborhood-structure features derived from the network. Our experiments reveal a clear dif-
ference between the features that are predictive for claims with a known label (i.e., investigated
claims) versus claims with a confirmed fraud label. The classical intrinsic features registered for
claims and policyholders are good at distinguishing claims with a known label, which is intuitive
as these are traditionally used by the insurance company to flag suspicious claims for further
investigation. Features distinguishing fraudulent claims from the other claims in the dataset
are the score and neighborhood features. We demonstrate the fitness of the proposed network
representation as well as its added value in fraud detection strategies. Not only previous fraud-
ulent behavior of a policyholder, but also a claim’s entire social network is of great importance
to detect new fraudulent claims. As such, our method is ‘white box’, we can interpret the net-
work derived features, as opposed to the network representation learning approaches which are
currently prominent in the literature. Resent research on using features derived from variations
of the personalized PageRank algorithm, has demonstrated its potential to capture complex
non-linear effects and correlations between interconnected objects, such as borrowers in credit
scoring (O´skarsdo´ttir et al., 2019; Bravo and O´skarsdo´ttir, 2020).
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The results of the methodology presented in this paper facilitate continued research for social
network based fraud detection in insurance. Firstly, in our methodology we omitted the time-
weighting of fraud influence and of edges, an approach presented in Van Vlasselaer et al. (2016).
This would be a very interesting addition and potentially may help to better understand fraud
recency in the insurance context. Secondly, in this paper, we used SMOTE, a state-of-the-
art method that is common in the fraud literature, to rebalance the dataset. More in depth
research on the difference between such methods is possible, which we would like to explore in
our future work. Thirdly, there is selection bias with respect to the fraudulent claims, since only
suspicious claims undergo a fraud investigation. Because of this potential bias, we decided to
consider three types of labels: unknown, fraud and non-fraud, and deployed our one-versus-all
approach with the two datasets, Dknown and Dfraud. However, the availability of labelled as well
as unlabelled claims is an ideal premise for a semi-supervised machine learning approach. We
would like to explore such methods in order to accommodate for the low ratio of labelled claims
which is an inherent problem we faced in our research. Such an approach was developed amongs
others for rejected loan applications by Li et al. (2020) and could potentially help in finding
the rare fraudulent claims in our case. Next, graph based anomaly detection methods would
be an interesting approach to find the rare fraudulent claims in the network. Such methods
are becoming increasingly more prominent in the network science research community. Finally,
with the fast growing development of network representation learning, there is an opportunity
to learn low dimensional vector representations for the nodes in a network. These methods
use deep learning approaches to learn structural properties of the nodes in a network and the
resulting representations can subsequently be used with a supervised machine learning technique
to classify the nodes, like we did here for fraud. In our future work we will especially focus on
frameworks such as GraphSAGE that leverage feature rich nodes, such as the claims in our case
(Hamilton et al., 2017).
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